Episode 10

full
Published on:

17th Nov 2026

GameStop Lost Most of Its Stores. Here Is Why It Is Still Here.

GameStop built its business on trade-ins. A customer finished a game, traded it in for store credit, and the store resold the used copy at a discount. That model depended on physical discs, a steady flow of new releases, and rules that allowed resale.

This episode follows how that business narrowed over time: the shift to digital sales, the decisions management made while sales were falling, the commitments that built up around a shrinking profit source, and the year the used-game business weakened and an accounting charge became the largest number in the results. It then looks at where the company stands now, with fewer stores, a profitable retail business, and a balance sheet larger than its retail sales.

The figures are as of August 2026, except where noted.

Links referenced in this episode:

Transcript
Speaker A:

This is deliberate drift.

Speaker A:

I'm Dawn Porthouse.

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Today's subject is GameStop.

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I wanted to understand how a store built on trading and used games is still here after losing most of its stores.

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I'll start with how I remember it.

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I remember taking my son and years later, one of my granddaughters to GameStop to trade in games and pick up the newest ones for them to play.

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And of course, to check out the latest products.

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They used to spend at least an hour each time we went.

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My son was always looking for the next hockey or football game, and my granddaughter loved the Princess Games and Wii Gaming was not something I was into, but it was something they both enjoyed, and it made it more affordable.

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I don't remember the last time we went to GameStop with my granddaughter as she grew older and her interests changed.

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What follows is what I found in GameStop's own filings and releases.

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ode are as of early September:

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So what was GameStop actually selling?

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The business started at the trading counter.

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A customer finished a game and traded in for store credit.

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GameStop expected most of that credit to be spent on new merchandise.

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Then the store resold their used copy at a discount.

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In GameStop's fiscal year:

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A new title averaged $48.

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That used copy mattered more than it might seem in one quarter.

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In:

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Gross profit is what's left of a sale after you subtract what the goods cost.

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Used games, which the company calls pre owned products, earned about 46 cents of gross profit on every sales dollar that held for three years running.

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New games earned about half that.

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GameStop built the scale to run that business at volume.

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A merger with electronics boutique gave it thousands of stores.

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By:

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Competitors tried to copy it and found it hard.

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t Buy relaunched Trade Ins in:

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An analyst named Arvind Bathia had already listed the problems it ran into, including keeping the right games in stock and knowing how to price them.

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Three things held the model up.

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First, physical disks.

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Second, new releases, which kept a supply of games coming back as trade ins.

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Third, rules that allowed resale.

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The third was outside GameStop's control.

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Game publishers, the companies that made the games, could limit trade ins or resale.

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GameStop's annual reports list that as a risk to its results.

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Here is what was supposed to threaten that model.

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In May:

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A new game came with a one time code for online features.

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A buyer of a used copy could buy a code for $10.

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Digital sales grew at the same time, GameStop tracks what it calls digital receipts, the full retail value customers pay for digital content.

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But accounting rules record only the commission Gamestop earns on those sales, so the sales line shows far less.

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In fiscal:

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GameStop's reported digital sales were only about 194 million.

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op's own results in the early:

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In fiscal:

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The next year, sales of new hardware, new software and used games all fell.

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The company pointed to the length of the console cycle, meaning the years between one generation of consoles and the next.

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Even so, its profit on each sales dollar went up that year, helped by better results on new and used products.

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The releases and filings I reviewed did not connect GameStop's used game results to publisher restrictions.

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I expected the publisher to be blamed, as online gaming was becoming more prominent.

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But the filings did not blame the publishers.

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While sales were falling, management did two things.

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It returned cash to shareholders and it bought businesses.

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First, the cash shareholder dividends rose every year, up to $1.52 a share.

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One of those raises came in a year when sales at comparable stores, meaning stores open at least 12 months, fell 11%.

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Management described a share buyback and a dividend increase as evidence of confidence in the company's future.

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While it worked through the low point of this console cycle, borrowing followed.

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Debt grew from almost nothing to more than $800 million in four years.

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Second is the acquisitions.

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GameStop also brought businesses outside the trade in model, chief executive Paul Raine said.

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Perhaps most importantly, we invested in our mobile and digital businesses to position the company for future success.

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stores to more than:

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GameStop also agreed to buy the parent company of ThinkGeek, citing a targeted annual return.

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Each choice had a case at the time, sales at comparable stores rose three years in a row.

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e it hard to change course by:

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It looked at five conditions that might have eliminated what Gamestop could change.

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Four did, and each made the others harder to adjust.

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The fifth did not.

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First is concentration.

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Used games was still the biggest single source of gross profit, ahead of technology brands and new software.

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But the used share of the total was slipping.

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It went from about 38% to about 32% in two years.

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The business that earned the most was earning a smaller share of the total.

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Second, rules set elsewhere, the terms of resale belong to publishers and to the companies that make the consoles.

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GameStop's latest annual report still lists limits on used games as a risk.

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It also notes that Sony and Microsoft sell consoles that play only digital games.

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For those buyers, that removes both new and used physical games.

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Third, payouts and debt by then, dividend had climbed to $1.52 a share and debt had grown sharply.

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These were commitments, and they rested on a profit source that was shrinking as a share of the business.

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Fourth, the premiums are paid for acquisition.

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When a company pays more for a business than its physical assets are worth, the difference is recorded as goodwill.

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At that point, goodwill and similar assets come to $1.8 billion.

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If an acquired business earned less than assumed, the company would have to write the balance down.

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It had already written some of that down, mainly for technology brands.

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In its annual report for that year, the company describes itself as a global family of specialty retail brands that makes the most popular technologies affordable and simple and and fifth, the one that did not limit it A large store base with short leases.

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GameStop had thousands of stores, and leases on more than 4,000 of them were due to expire within two years, so the store base was less rigid than it looked.

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Lease terms were not the limit on the change.

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The limit was a profit source on the commitments built on it.

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Concentration made the payouts look safe, and the rules sell elsewhere made them uncertain.

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The acquisition added value on the company's books that depended on results outside the games business as the used game business weakened.

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The largest figure in GameStop's results the following year was an accounting charge.

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The company wrote down nearly $1 billion of goodwill, the premiums it no longer expected to recover.

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That left the company with an operating loss.

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In late March, GameStop paid its usual quarterly dividend.

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Four days later, it reported that used game sales had fallen 13% for the year and had fallen faster in the fourth quarter.

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Rob Floyd, its chief operating officer and chief financial officer, said, we recognize the challenges facing our pre owned video game business and are prepared to address them.

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The same release announced a program to improve profit and the repayment of some of its notes.

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In June, the board eliminated the dividend to strengthen the balance sheet.

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Results fell further, and over the next Two years, the company closed a net total of more than 1,000 stores.

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The way out came from outside the business.

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In April:

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In June, it sold more at about $225 each.

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It sold the shares gradually into the open market.

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The stock was then in a short squeeze.

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That is a rapid price raise as investors who bet against a stock are forced to buy it.

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The company's annual report said it produced price moves unrelated or disproportionate to its operating performance.

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Not long before, the company had bought back more than a third of its shares at an average of about $5 each.

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GameStop bought back its stock when nobody wanted it and then sold shares when investors couldn't get enough of it, turning market excitement into cash.

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The proceeds went to losses nearly $700 million over two years.

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Even so, GameStop ended that stretch with more than $1 billion in cash.

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The next year, the cost of running the business beyond the goods sold fell about a fifth.

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The company reported a small profit.

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So what's left?

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Gamestop now describes itself in two parts.

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Its latest annual report names capital allocation, which means using its cash to buy or invest in businesses.

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And it names operational excellence, which means getting the most cash out of the older retail business.

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The retail business is smaller, and it is profitable.

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Net sales fell more than 60% in eight years.

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That comparison starts from a year when sales included technology brands.

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In its latest year, Gamestop made an operating profit after a loss the year before.

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Years ago, it had about 7,500 stores.

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In its latest year, it ended with about 2,200.

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That's less than a third.

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The mix has changed.

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Collectibles, which include trading cards, were 45% of net sales in the latest quarter, nearly double the year before.

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Pre owned and refurbished goods now sit in a new reporting category that can't be compared with the used game figures earlier in this episode.

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Most of the latest quarter's net income came from net gains on investment, so a large part of reported profit comes from investments.

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The balance sheet now holds more than the retail business sells in a year.

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At the end of its latest fiscal year, GameStop held $9 billion in cash and short term investments that can be sold quickly.

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That followed the issue of convertible notes, which are loans that holders can exchange for shares.

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By August, it was over 5 billion.

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That brings us to eBay.

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In early May, GameStop offered $125 a share for eBay, half in cash, half in stock.

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EBay's board rejected the offer.

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Soon after, GameStop kept building its stake.

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In July, it took delivery of ebay shares under option contracts it had bought earlier, which gave it the right to buy them.

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It paid about $4 billion in cash that bought its holdings to 9.8% of eBay.

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The filings I reviewed report no revised offer and no agreement between the two companies.

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In August, the company agreed to exchange some of those notes for shares and cash.

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The exchange was completed in early September.

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It's been years since I set foot into GameStop, and I haven't closely tracked their recent journey.

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In writing this episode, I was genuinely surprised to learn that they are still around, smaller and actually profitable.

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This has been Delivered Drift.

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The full article is available@delivered drift.com if you like the next episode when it comes out.

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Subscribe wherever you listen.

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I'm Dawn Porthouse.

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Thanks for listening.

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About the Podcast

Deliberate Drift Podcast
Deliberate Drift analyzes how companies change structurally over time, not through sudden crises or obvious mistakes, but through slow, deliberate drift.
Deliberate Drift analyzes how companies change structurally over time, not through sudden crises or obvious mistakes, but through slow, deliberate drift.

Some episodes follow companies whose options narrowed gradually: decisions that looked rational while constraints accumulated out of view. Others follow companies whose structural position strengthened over time: decisions that looked ordinary or even wrong while advantages quietly compounded.

In both cases, the analysis focuses on what was building beneath the surface, and why it was almost impossible to see clearly while it was happening.

No dramatic framing. No hindsight conclusions. Just the structural logic of how businesses actually change.

Full written analysis at deliberatedrift.com

About your host

Profile picture for Dawn Porthouse

Dawn Porthouse

Analyst, writer, and entrepreneur (MBA, EA) with years working as a CFO and tax advisor to small and mid-sized businesses. I've spent that time inside the numbers, watching how businesses grow, stall, and quietly veer off course long before anyone calls it a problem.

Deliberate Drift is where I examine those moments: the decisions, assumptions, and slow shifts that shape where a business actually ends up, not just where it intended to go. It covers both sides: the drift toward constraint and the drift toward unexpected advantage.

I'm a full-time RVer, traveling the country with my husband and our dogs. Most of my thinking happens somewhere between the road and the work.